



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

REPUBLIC AND MONARCHY: FIFTEEN YEARS OF FRENCH DIPLOMACY.

BY ANDRÉ TARDIEU, FOREIGN EDITOR OF "LE TEMPS."

THE foreign policy of contemporary France is original in two particulars,—a republican policy is brought face to face with monarchical policies, and a new diplomacy has to treat with the old traditional diplomacy. Of course, changes in the form of government do not necessarily affect diplomatic relations between different nations. Thus, history shows us Francis I, "the very Christian king," holding diplomatic intercourse with "the unspeakable Turk"; Richelieu treating with Protestants, and Mazarin negotiating with the regicide Cromwell. It must be admitted, however,—and we have frequently experienced this fact since 1871,—that a country which has changed its institutions in the direction of greater liberty is looked upon, for various reasons, with a sort of suspicion by the governments of the old régime. In the first place, such a country is considered a kind of revolutionary centre, which sets a dangerous example to monarchical peoples of indiscipline and rebellion, and, in the second place, it is held that democracies cannot pursue a foreign policy with any continuity. But it can be fairly said that French diplomacy, during the past fifteen years, has triumphed over these difficulties, and this fact may be set down as not one of its smallest merits. But it has had other good points. It has struck out on new lines, making the basis of its activities an alliance—that with Russia—and a friendly understanding—that with England, which had long been held as desirable, but which became a reality only recently. This double originality characteristic of French foreign policy during the Third Republic gives it a peculiar stamp which a free country like the United States will fully appreciate.

The first thing French diplomacy had to do on the foundation of the present Republic was to escape from the isolation which was the inevitable consequence of the disasters of 1870. It is only the strong who are respected and courted. The period covered by the National Assembly (1871-77) was one of simple reconstruction, and the presidency of M. Grévy (1879-87) represented a season of meditation and waiting. It was not till M. Carnot entered the Elysée (1887-94) that France, finally feeling herself on her feet again, turned her attention to the outside world. The first glance abroad was not reassuring. Bismarck at that moment still exercised an unquestioned supremacy throughout Europe, grasping with an iron hand the reins of the Triple Alliance. Austria and Italy obeyed him with docility. Spanish sympathies turned towards Germany, and England felt a hostility to France on account of her course in Egypt and because of numerous colonial rivalries. France was surrounded by a circle of hatred, antipathy or ill-disposed indifference; while, at the other end of Europe, Russia, so different from France in many respects, was attracted to her by the similarity of her diplomatic situation. She, too, was a victim of Prince Bismarck. The Berlin Congress of 1878 crushed her hopes of at last putting her hands on Constantinople, just as the Treaty of Frankfort of 1871 registered the defeats of France; she suffered with impatience the Teutonic yoke under which all Europe was chafing. Hence it was that both parties—St. Petersburg and Paris—recognized that an alliance between the two countries was as natural as it was necessary, especially as Bismarck himself, thirty years before, had predicted such an occurrence. The bringing about of this alliance not only marked the end of France's isolation, but it also announced her reappearance on the European diplomatic stage, for a nation with a foreign policy does not stand alone, solidarity being the first of international laws when a country passes from a state of observation to one of action.

The Franco-Russian alliance has made it possible for France to view calmly its whole foreign political field. For twenty years, she had been pursuing a fine colonial activity, but only with the tacit consent of Germany, which thought it wise to encourage her in these distant enterprises, as they kept her mind from brooding on the question of her eastern frontier. But with the advent of the Russian alliance she escaped this sort of tutelage

and can now look after her own affairs in her own way. A glance at the map shows that, outside of a Franco-German war, it is on the Mediterranean only that France can find a field for her activities. There she possesses two first-class colonies—Algeria and Tunis,—which give her perhaps the leading place in the western part of that portion of the world. But they are exposed to several dangers so long as Morocco continues to be in a chronic state of anarchy.

The first of these dangers arises from the nature of the Mohammedan population of those regions, the various countries being closely bound together, notwithstanding separating boundary lines. The spirit of revolt is there contagious. The second danger arises from the temptation that some other European nation might feel to intervene in Moroccan affairs and seek to gain a dominant influence there. This would be a direct menace to France's colonies of Algeria and Tunis. Consequently, in order to protect her present possessions in northwest Africa, France must prevent all nations, except herself or her allies, from securing a predominant position in Morocco; and, in the second place, she must, through a system of wise reforms, bring about an orderly government in that distracted land. In other words, France has to apply there a sort of African Monroe Doctrine. I may add that, through force of circumstances, this new Morocco Doctrine was formulated while M. Delcassé was our Minister of Foreign Affairs (1898-1905), and since then it has held the first place in French foreign policy, bringing about in 1905-1906 a grand diplomatic contest in which all the leading nations took part.

Before the meeting of the Algeciras Conference, it was found that, if France were to carry through her Moroccan policy and to take an active part in general European foreign politics, she must have other backing than the Russian alliance. It was necessary to strengthen that alliance by complementary understandings,—with England, in the first place, and next with Italy and Spain. The negotiations occasioned by the necessity for this triple understanding, with the side issues which they created, form the greater part of the diplomatic history of France during the last five years.

France began the task by making approaches to Italy, where her object could be more easily attained on account of economical

causes, which now play such a large part in international relations. It was to the commercial interest of Italy to turn towards France. The Franco-Italian tariff war had cost Italy more than it had cost France, the influx of German capital on the other side of the Alps having given but momentary relief, and when, in 1900, a financial crisis broke upon Germany, a serious disaster would have befallen the young kingdom if France had refused financial aid to Italy. The treaty of commerce negotiated in 1898 between the two countries was the first step towards this much-desired reconciliation, and the good work was completed by the agreements brought about in November, 1900, and December, 1902, by which Italy left France free to act in Morocco in exchange for a similar liberty for herself in Tripoli. At the same time, France was assured, though the importance of this concession must not be exaggerated, that Italy's presence in the Triple Alliance was no longer a menace to France.

The good understanding with England followed that with Italy. At first, this move was regarded with scepticism; but, in the end, it won the confidence of both nations. At the start, it was to affect only old colonial quarrels; but to-day it has become a universally accepted basis of all diplomatic action. This is unquestionably the most brilliant and the boldest international act of the past thirty years. When, in 1902, King Edward announced his intention of making an official visit to Paris with the approval of the French Government, it was feared in some quarters that this act might occasion grave disorders or hostile manifestations in the Paris streets, which it might be difficult to cope with. But the journey was a more marked success than even the most sanguine had hoped for, and was the starting-point for the negotiations which ended with the agreement between the two countries signed on April 8th, 1904. Passing over the accessory articles, the two main features of this treaty are that France recognizes the situation which England has assumed in Egypt, while England stands ready to approve the course which France may pursue in Morocco.

A few months later, a Franco-Spanish agreement was brought about,—the last link in this international chain which was to control the Mediterranean and Moroccan policy of the French Government; and, at the same moment, it opened up a period of difficulties. France had at last perceived, and perceived

rightly, that it was in the direction of the Mediterranean that she could reap new fruits. But, however rich this fruitage might be, she should not have been hypnotized thereby and should not have lost sight of the real situation on the European Continent and in the world in general. At the very moment when, armed with these three important supports—the Franco-Italian, the Franco-English and the Franco-Spanish understandings—M. Delcassé concentrated all his attention on Morocco, the governing influences on the Continent were unfavorable to the carrying out of the plans which the French Foreign Office had in view.

Germany, for instance, was ruffled at seeing these various combinations brought about without her having anything to say about them, and she was apprehensive concerning this good understanding between France and England at the moment when Anglo-German relations were very much strained. In a word, Berlin was simply waiting for a favorable occasion when she could intervene and give vent to her pent-up anger. And at the same time, Russia, foolishly dragged by imprudent statesmen and unscrupulous men of business, whose moneyed interests were in the Far East, into a losing war with Japan, found herself momentarily without weight in the councils of Europe. A cool head and even a little foresight should have sufficed to convince any one that at such a time the greatest prudence should be exercised. But M. Delcassé seems to have shut his eyes to the danger, with the result now known to everybody.

German hostility suddenly showed itself at a moment when the military strength of France was not all that it might have been, and when her allies were in an embarrassed position. Paris was seized with a panic, M. Delcassé was forced to throw up his portfolio under conditions that were not agreeable to our national pride, and M. Rouvier, stepping into the vacant place, did his best to pull the country out of this Moroccan slough. It was a sad period—this smoothing down of old difficulties and the beginning anew again. Its moving history I have told in my book, "*The Conference of Algeciras*." Thanks to the ability of French diplomacy and the fidelity of her allies and friends, France finally got out of the difficulty much more successfully than she had a right to hope for.

At the very start, France agreed to the demand that her plan for the reform of Morocco should be submitted to the approval

of the other nations, on condition that Germany should not call in question, at the Conference about to open, certain governing principles of the Moroccan policy of France. The Franco-German agreements, drawn up in July and September, 1905, after weary negotiations, of whose daily progress I was a witness, prepared the way for the calling together of the Conference which was held at Algeciras from January 5th to April 7th, 1906.

This Conference was not only interesting from a Mediterranean and Moroccan standpoint, but it was even more important, as came out more and more clearly as the proceedings went on, as an occasion for a sort of "resistance test" of the alliances, understandings and friendships so rife in Europe at that moment. Thus, the Russian Alliance then came to the fore again; for the war in Manchuria was over, and Russia was bringing her troops back to Europe. So Russia became a great aid to her ally, and the energetic instructions sent on March 19th, 1906, by Count Lamsdorf to Count Cassini, his representative at the Conference, did much to bring about the final result, which, taken all in all, was favorable to France, for authority was given to her, in conjunction with Spain, to police the eight Moroccan ports. The severest diplomatic attacks witnessed at the Conference had to be met by the Franco-English friendship. In 1905, a few months before the meeting of the Conference, Germany did her best to break it by trying to frighten France by threatening war. We have not forgotten the demands of the chief fuglemen on the German side—Professor Schiemann, Prince Henckel von Donnersmarck and von Holstein—that France must give hostages to keep the peace! Again, in 1906, when the Conference convened, a bolder attempt was made to trouble France's relations with England. It was given out that Great Britain, having got out of the understanding all that could be got out of it, was now quite ready to shake it off, become free again and then to enter into an agreement with Germany! Not only did the "*entente cordiale*" stand firm against all these insidious attacks, but it came out of the struggle stronger than ever. This good understanding made itself felt in all the capitals of Europe, as well as at Algeciras. The intimate and continual collaboration of the French and English representatives was especially marked at Madrid in the persons of M. Jules Cambon and Mr. Cartwright, the British *Chargé d'Affaires*; in Rome, in the persons of M.

Barrère and Mr. Egerton; and in St. Petersburg, in the persons of M. Bompard and Sir Charles Hardinge. It was the cynosure of all eyes, presenting a solid front capable of balancing the effects of the Triple Alliance. To use a scientific term, at Algeciras the Anglo-French agreement passed from the static to the dynamic state.

The Algeciras Conference was also a test of the strength of the Triple Alliance, and I do not think it can be said that that Alliance came out of this trial rejuvenated. Italy, very much annoyed by this dispute, which set its Continental engagements of 1882 against its Mediterranean engagements of 1900 and 1902, tried from the very first day of the meeting to be faithful to both. That was not what Germany had expected. She wished the Italian plenipotentiary to act as her second in this international duel; only this and nothing more. But Italy still belongs to the Triple Alliance, and though I do not share the opinion of some of my fellow countrymen that she belongs to it only for the form, I think she interprets her obligations in a far more liberal sense than was formerly the case. And this change dates from Algeciras.

As for Austria, the other member of the Triple Alliance, she played at Algeciras a conciliatory part, which the German Emperor has publicly approved. But, though she was scrupulously correct in her relations to the German Foreign Office, she always strove during the Conference to maintain her intellectual and moral liberty. The Triple Alliance, consequently, still stands, but I do not think I go too far when I say that its character has been modified. It is now less despotic and, if I may be permitted the expression, more parliamentary.

Thus, the upshot of this acute European crisis, which I have called "the conflict of the alliances," was that all the diplomatic combinations stood, at the end of the Conference of Algeciras, just about where they stood at the beginning of the Conference. In a word, there was no marked, material change in the international arrangements which had so provoked the anger of Germany. This fact comes out perfectly clearly in the speech delivered in the German Reichstag on November 14th, 1906, by Prince von Bülow, when he had only honeyed words for these combinations, some of his expressions meaning explicitly, others implicitly, that he accepted the new situation created by M. Del-

cassé's policy, to which, however, Germany had been so firmly opposed in 1905. It is not surprising, therefore, that this policy, which has sometimes been called "the policy of Eastern understandings," has constantly developed since the spring of 1906—that is, since the close of the Algeiras Conference. In the first place, it has been strengthened by the two identical treaties which Spain has signed with France and with England, and which are mutual guarantees of the *status quo* in the western Mediterranean and in the eastern Atlantic; and, in the second place, three other agreements, of which Europe is not the theatre, have in various ways rendered the relations of France with her allies and friends more precise and more easily carried out. A word about these three acts.

More than once in the past, the rivalries between England and Russia have given some ground for surprise at France's simultaneous good understanding with these two Powers. But the Anglo-Russian agreement, brought about a few months ago, has removed this difficulty. The Russo-Japanese war was the cause of much of France's trouble with Germany in 1905, and it was only too plain that any friction between the Governments of St. Petersburg and Tokio was sure to be an embarrassment for France. But the Russo-Japanese agreement of last year, which greatly strengthens the treaty of Portsmouth, makes for a durable peace between those two countries. Thirdly, the recent Franco-Japanese treaty, which guarantees the Asiatic possessions of the contracting parties, adds another trump card to the very strong hand held by France. I may further add that the present improved state of the relations between England and Germany is favorable to the maintenance of peace, which is a source of unconcealed pleasure in France.

The survey of these alliances and friendships, with their bearings on French politics, would not be complete without a word as to the amicable relations which exist between France and the United States. The foundation of this friendly feeling was laid back beyond the past century, and it is a pleasure to perceive that it grows firmer with the years. I need not dwell on the fresh evidences of this friendship which have been seen on several occasions during recent years and which are so free from all thought of compensation of any kind; nor need I point out the probability that nothing will ever disturb these happy rela-

tions; for the two countries have no conflicting interests. But I wish to record the fact that France is very grateful to the American Government for what it did during the difficulties of 1905 and 1906, which have just been dwelt upon. I can speak all the more honestly of this gratefulness, because American diplomacy, faithful to its governing principles, did not take a light view of the part it could play at the Algeciras Conference, where, on the contrary, swayed by a noble wish to have peace prevail, it resolved to give its vote to the side which presented the most reasonable and equitable case; and it so happened that, in this instance, it was France which fulfilled these conditions. We believe in France that President Roosevelt is still high in praise of the frankness of our intentions at Algeciras, and his approval of our course gives us deep pleasure, for we look upon the present incumbent of the White House as a man of good judgment, large heart and marked ability.

France is often misjudged abroad because she takes an unhealthy pleasure in fouling her own nest. We Frenchmen sometimes carry so far our hatred of hypocrisy that we are apt to boast of our vices. I am well aware of our national weaknesses. Too much importance is often given to our interior quarrels. The different political parties hurt the country by their excesses. The larger interests of the nation are sacrificed to the lesser. Some Frenchmen, however, hold that, if faults do really exist, they should not be dwelt upon. This means living continually in a fool's paradise, which is as bad for nations as for individuals. The country which is told and accepts that famous remark: "Not a gaiter-button is missing," is apt to wake up some fine morning in Sedan! Let it be admitted that contemporary France has her faults, but let it be added that she also has her merits. And among these merits is surely this diplomatic achievement, whose principal outlines and essential features I have just given, and whose chief creators have been the ten or more Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the past fifteen or sixteen years, of whom I shall say a word in closing.

The more recent occupants of the Palace of the Quai d'Orsay have differed considerably from one another, as regards their early beliefs, their tendencies, their intellectual calibre and their moral character. Glancing for a moment at the more important of them, I would say that M. Hanotaux has nothing in common

with M. Ribot or M. Delcassé. M. Rouvier cannot be likened to M. Bourgeois, while the latter does not at all resemble the present incumbent, M. Pichon. But, notwithstanding these differences and in some cases these antinomies, a well-formed French foreign policy has been created, which may sometimes have varied, shown signs of indecision and even made positive mistakes, but which, on the whole, has been consistent in its aim and in the means employed to attain its object. It has, for instance, been faithful to the initial alliance with Russia, trying to complete it, but, at the same time, careful not to sap its strength; negotiating the English treaties and striving to harmonize them with the Russian understanding; limiting its efforts to a single field—the north African and Mediterranean regions—and, in spite of some rebuffs, getting nearer and nearer its goal. For it cannot be questioned that, at the present moment, in spite of the difficulties arising from the anarchy which now prevails in Morocco, the peculiarly privileged position which France occupies in that country, a position, however, which does not imply a spirit of conquest or monopoly, is to-day far less questioned by the interested Powers than was the case three years ago.

Is there, then, in all Europe—if we except England, perhaps—another country whose diplomatic activity has been as tenacious, as unremitting and as successful as that of France? I do not think so. I am always ready to admit that diplomacy, unless backed by military force, is of little avail. I am convinced that France should have an eye to other means of defence. Nor do I despair of our seeing the situation in this light; and if we need the encouragement of examples of patriotic energy, these examples are not far to seek; and for one such we have simply to turn to the United States.

ANDRÉ TARDIEU.